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Abstract—With current tools and technology, someone who
has physical access to a chip can extract the detailed layout of
the integrated circuit (IC). By using advanced visual imaging
techniques, reverse engineering can reveal details that are meant to
be kept secret, such as a secure protocol or novel implementation
that offers a competitive advantage. A promising solution to defend
against reverse engineering attacks is IC camouflaging. In this
work, we propose a new camouflaging technique based on the
threshold voltage of the transistors. We refer to these cells as
threshold dependent camouflaged cells. Our work differs from
current commercial solutions in that the latter use look-alike cells,
with the assumption that it is difficult for the reverse engineer
to identify the cell’s functionality. Yet, if a structural distinction
between cells exists, then these are still vulnerable, especially
as reverse engineers use more advanced and precise techniques.
On the other hand, the proposed threshold dependent standard
cells are structurally identical regardless of the cells’ functionality.
Detailed circuit simulations of our proposed threshold dependent
camouflaged cells demonstrate that they can be used to cost-
effectively and robustly camouflage large netlists. Corner analysis
of process, temperature, and supply voltage (PVT) variations show
that our cells operate as expected over all PVT corners simulated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need to protect the intellectual property (IP) of integrated
circuit (IC) design companies is increasing as threats from IC
reverse engineering attacks become more prominent. Reverse
engineering of ICs consists of using advanced depackaging,
delayering and imaging techniques in order to acquire the gate-
level netlist. Not only is it possible to successfully obtain
the full layout and netlist of complex ICs fabricated using
advanced processes [1], it is also commercially feasible, such
that companies such as Chipworks [2] and Degate [3] offer
these services. IC reverse engineering can cause the competitive
advantage of a chip maker to diminish, as well as reveal details
about the chip that are meant to be secret, for example, the
implementation of a secure communication protocol [4].
IC camouflaging technology has been proposed [5], [6]
as a way to counteract reverse engineering attacks. With this
countermeasure, the designer aims to hinder the ability of the
reverse engineer to visually decipher the functionality of a gate.
For example, NAND and XOR gates are made visually similar
by fabricating them with identical metal and polysilicon layers
and contact locations. The difference lies in what type of contacts
are placed. These contacts may either be true or dummy. The
former electrically connects the two layers, and the latter has a
small gap in the middle so that it behaves like an open circuit.
The selection of which type of contact to use establishes the
functionality of a gate.
The principal assumption in this method is that, due to
imprecision in the etching process [5], [6], the attacker is unable
to discriminate between true and dummy contacts. Consequently,
the Boolean functionality of the camouflaged gate cannot be
ascertained by exclusively using traditional reverse engineering
techniques. This method is referred to as dummy contact based
camouflaging.
The expectation that a reverse engineer’s capabilities and
techniques will not improve and become more sophisticated and
precise reveals a weakness in dummy contact based camouflag-
ing. Indeed, ICs fabricated in advanced technology nodes down
to 22 nm have been reverse engineered [1]. This illustrates that
while visually discernible differences in layout structure exist,
the threat from IC imaging based reverse engineering attacks
will remain.
In this paper, we propose a new camouflaging technique
that addresses this vulnerability. We present an approach that
leverages the intrinsic characteristics of the material used in-
stead of the physical structure of a camouflaged gate. For this
reason the gate layout, including vias and contacts, is the same
regardless of its Boolean functionality. Instead, the functionality
of the proposed camouflaged gate is determined by the threshold
voltage of its transistors, that is, depending on whether it has
been fabricated using a high-Vth or low-Vth process. As such,
this technique uses the standard features available in commercial
CMOS dual-Vth (or multi-Vth) processes [7]. We call this
technique threshold dependent (TD) camouflaging and the cells
are called TD camouflaged cells. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to present a camouflaging solution that
leverages commercial multi-Vth CMOS processes to camouflage
the Boolean functionality of a gate depending on whether it has
been fabricated using high-Vth or low-Vth transistors.
There are several advantages that result from using TD
camouflaged cells. First, traditional etching and optical imaging
techniques used by reverse engineers are ineffective since the
functionality of the cell depends on the threshold voltage, which
in turn is determined by the doping concentration of the cell.
Second, even though an attacker can image and identify the
doping concentration of a cell using methods such as spreading
resistance profiling (SRP) and secondary ion mass spectrom-
etry (SIMS), these have limited spatial resolution [8]. Other
approaches involve using scanning capacitance probes. While
these can offer higher spatial resolution they still have limited
accuracy because they do not directly measure dopant concentra-
tion [8]. As Chipworks notes, physical features can potentially
be reverse engineered deep into the nanometer scale “...with
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high-resolution electron microscopy, but obtaining details of the
chemical composition of the structure is now in the realm of
counting atoms” [9].
Our approach can be used in conjunction with a multi-Vth
process [7] in a cost effective manner. That is, each cell can
be manufactured using either high-Vth or low-Vth, depending
on the gate that it is replacing, which means that camouflaging
k cells results in up to 2k different possible functions. Lastly,
we note that TD camouflaged cells can be used in conjunction
with dummy contact based camouflaged technique to make the
reverse engineering problem even harder for an attacker.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
The novel contributions of this work are:
• Proposal of TD camouflaged cells, a logic cell whose
Boolean functionality depends on its threshold voltage,
• design, analysis and evaluation of a specific instance of
a TD camouflaged cell that functions as either an AND
or an OR gate depending on its threshold voltage, and
• experimental results showing the robustness of TD
camouflaged cells over process, voltage and temperature
(PVT) corners, and comparing the delay and power
overheads of TD camouflaged cells to conventional logic
families.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III,
we describe previous work related to our paper. Section IV,
presents and discusses the design of TD camouflaged cells as
well as considerations for robustness to process variations. We
report experimental results in Section V. Finally, we conclude
our paper in Section VII.
III. RELATED WORK
The idea of controlling the functionality of a cell by using
varying operating parameters has been previously proposed. For
instance, [10], [11], [12], [13] explore the use of polymorphic
gates. These cells are characterized by having different function-
alities that change according to the variation of supply voltage
or temperature. Since controlling temperature is complicated and
determining the supply voltage of each gate is feasible, these
cells cannot be used for IC camouflaging.
A previous notion that has been explored in the context of
IC camouflaging is the use of look-alike cells [5], [6]. The
functionality of these cells depend on the location of true and
dummy contacts which are claimed to hinder the capability of
the attacker to identify which vias are functional. Even though
this technique is used to prevent the reverse engineering of an
IC, it still relies on a physical structural difference, which may
not deter a more skilled attacker.
Our proposed TD camouflaged cells are structurally identical,
yet their function depends on an inherent characteristic of the
transistor. Hence the attacker would require more sophisticated
tools to “image” the threshold voltage of each cell since this is
dependant on channel doping. Our cells can be used in addition
to or instead of conventional dummy-contact based camouflaged
cells.
There is some prior work involving threshold voltage based
camouflaging [14], [15]. The first technique [14] uses se-
lective ion implantation in certain transistors to ensure that
these transistors become permanently “stuck-at” either logic
0 or logic 1 (essentially converting transistors to permanently
on/off switches). This introduces two problems: (1) the required
increase in channel doping is large, making it easier for an
attacker to detect; and (2) the approach requires extra steps in the
current CMOS flow. In contrast, TD camouflaged cells leverages
existing, commercial multi-Vth processes, and requires much
subtler changes in doping density. The latter [15] technique
uses post-fabrication focused-ion beams (FIB) to alter doping
concentration. This must be done individually for each chip,
making it a slow and expensive process. Concurrently with our
work, another approach for threshold-dependent camouflaging
has been recently proposed. However, this approach requires the
generation and distribution of additional precise voltages on the
chip (besides VDD and ground), while having similar overheads
as our technique [16]. Since the paper is currently an Arxiv
draft made available only very recently, a thorough empirical
comparison is left as future work.
Finally, note that recent work has also proposed stealthily
changing the polarity of the diffusion layer for both attack [17]
and defense [18]. In this, the polarity of the diffusion layer is
changed. Attacks on these techniques that are able to reverse
engineer the polarity of a diffusion layer (p- or n-type) [19]
would not work for TD camouflaged cells since we only change
the doping concentration, not polarity.
Given access to a camouflaging technique, prior work has
also addressed the problem of which gates to camouflage so
as to make it difficult for the attacker to reverse engineer their
identities given the input/output behaviour of the chip [6]. A
recent attack on this technique has demonstrated that the number
of gates that needs to be camouflaged is much larger than
previously thought [20]. Regardless, the question of which and
how many gates in the netlist to camouflage is orthogonal to the
work presented in this paper.
IV. TD CAMOUFLAGED CELLS
A. Basic Operating Principle
When transistor pass gates are connected in a cascade layout
like in Figure 1 (Left),
the voltage at VOUT drops after each stage. In this layout, if
VIN is set to VDD, then, the maximum voltage at VOUT,1 will
be VDD−VTh. Consequently, if VIN of M2 is set to VDD then,
VOUT,2 will be VDD − 2 × VTh. As we continue to connect
transistors in this way we can see that the voltage at the source
can be characterized by VDD−n ×VTh, where n is the number
of stages of connected transistors. We make these assumptions
for an ideal NMOS device with no sub-threshold leakage. Since
VTh depends on the doping concentration of the transistor, the
voltage at the source of Mn varies according to the threshold
voltage asserted during the fabrication process.
Figure 1 (Left) shows the layout in which the n = 4
NMOS transistors are connected as well as the output voltage
at each source terminal for for each stage obtained from a
simulation using Predictive Technology Models (PTM) [21] for
a 22 nm technology for High-VTh and for Low-VTh processes.
For each simulation all transistors in the layout were considered
to have either High-VTh or Low-VTh. In Figure 1 (Right) we
can see that the output voltage decreases at each stage, and
more so for High-VTh simulations than for Low-VTh. Note that
the difference between the theoretically expected and observed
simulated results is due to the assumption of ideal transistors
with
zero off-current, when, for 22 nm technology, sub-threshold
conduction is non-negligible.
Fig. 1: (Left) A cascade of four NMOS level-converting pass
transistors. (Right) Output of each stage with transistors fab-
ricated in Low-VTh versus High-VTh process. Observe that
the output voltage levels for the latter are lower than the
corresponding voltage levels for the former.
B. Threshold-Dependant Camouflaged Cells - AND/OR
1) Schematic Design: Using the previous principle we have
developed a layout of a gate that can have the functionality of
AND or OR depending on the threshold voltage that is asserted
during the manufacturing process.
Fig. 2: Proposed TD camouflaged cells schematic that functions
as an AND for High-VTh and as an OR operation for Low-VTh.
Figure 2 shows the schematic of our implementation of
a camouflaged AND/OR gate. It is a clocked logic family
(similar to domino logic). Our implementation has two phases of
execution, a predischarge (PRE) and an evaluate (EVAL) phase.
In the EVAL phase the clock CLK signal is logic 0, and it is 1
during the PRE phase.
The logic function is determined by the activation of one of
the four cases (branches), each dealing with a unique possible in-
put combination. The top two branches of the layout correspond
to inputs A = B = 0 and A = B = 1. We observe that the
Fig. 3: (Left) Low VTh voltage response of internal nodes of
TD camouflaged cells (Fig. 2) to inputs A = 0 → 1 and B =
0. Node X rises past 0.45V, causing node Y to fall, which in
turn forces the output to rise. This circuit behaves like an OR
gate. (Right) High VTh voltage response of internal nodes of TD
camouflaged cells (Fig. 2) to inputs A = 0 → 1 and B = 0.
Node X does not pass 0.11V and does not affect node Y. The
output remains the same. This circuit behaves like an AND gate.
output is the same regardless of the function of the cell. For these
cases transistors M1 and M2 are on while transistors M3 and
M4 are off, or vice versa. The third branch corresponds to A = 1
and B = 0. Here we notice that the output changes depending
on whether the desired functionality is an OR or an AND cell.
In order to be able to obtain different behaviour, we connect
NMOS transistors M5 and M7 in the aforementioned cascaded
layout. Since we have the same case for A = 1 and B = 0,
we connect NMOS transistors M8 and M10 in the same manner
for last branch. In summary, we use the cascade configuration
when we want to be able to pull down to zero a specific input
combination depending on the manufacturing process.
This different behaviour can be visualized in Figure 3. In the
left, the voltage at Node X rises to 0.45 V , while in the right the
voltage rises to 0.11 V . We determine that the first voltage is a
logic 1 and the lower voltage is a logic 0 by setting the mid-point
voltage of the succeeding inverter, INV1, between 0.11 V and
0.45 V . In this manner we can observe an accentuated difference
at Node Y. In Figure 3 (Left), the voltage at Node Y falls below
0.2 V , while in Figure 3 (Right) the voltage remains close to
VDD. The final inverter, INV2, also skewed, provides clean logic
levels at the output.
2) Clocked Logic: So far we have assumed, implicitly, that
Node X is initialized to 0V , and either stays at 0V or transitions
to VDD. However, if Node X starts at VDD then the output for
the A = 1 and B = 0 case, as well as for the A = 0 and
B = 1, will stay at VDD for the High-VTh process. For correct
operation as an AND gate, the output is expected to fall to 0V .
In order to deal with this complication we add NMOS transistors
that pre-discharge the affected nodes. This technique is similar
to the one used in dynamic logic cells. When Clk = 1, Node X
is initialized to 0V . We also need to pre-discharge the outputs of
transistors M5 and M8 to eliminate accumulated charge at these
nodes over multiple clock cycles. Our schematic is composed
of the clocking transistors M6,M9,M11,M12, and M13. They
are necessary to discharge the nodes periodically. Lastly, TD
camouflaged cells operate as expected when the inputs transition
from 0 → 1 in the EVAL phase, which is like conventional
dynamic logic. On the other hand, if the input transitions from
1→ 0 during the EVAL phase, the output for the High-VTh case
may be incorrect. Consequently the proposed TD camouflaged
cells are compatible with domino logic implementations, but
cannot be used with static CMOS logic.
C. Integration With Domino Logic
Domino logic [22] is a clocked logic design family in which
each dynamic logic gate is followed by an inverting gate, for
example, a static CMOS inverter. Domino logic has been used in
commercial processor designs where speed is of the essence [23]
and work on improving performance of dynamic logic [24]
is ongoing. Domino logic gates implement non-complemented
Boolean functions like AND and OR instead of complemented
Boolean functions (such as NAND and NOR) like static CMOS.
Therefore, once a 0→ 1 transition occurs at the input, this will
result in a 0→ 1 transition at the output during the EVAL stage.
A domino logic implementation netlist can be camouflaged using
TD camouflaged cells by simply replacing conventional domino
AND and domino OR gates with the proposed camouflaged
AND/OR gate (Figure 4).
In Figure 4, the designer has chosen to camouflage two
gates using TD camouflaged cells. By using reverse engineering
techniques the attacker is unable to identify whether the TD
camouflaged cells are ANDs or ORs, therefore the camouflaged
netlist could implement one of four different Boolean logic
functions: (i) f = ABC + BC; (ii) f = C; (iii) f = ACB;
and (iv) f = 0. The set of possible functions that a netlist with
TD camouflaged cells could implement depends on the set of
gates that are chosen. We note, however, that the question of
how many and which gates to camouflage is out of the scope of
our work and is not addressed here.
D. Universal Logic Family
Like Domino logic, TD camouflaged cells implement non-
inverting logic gates. Therefore, a reasonable question to ask
is — can any Boolean logic function be implemented using
TD camouflaged cells? The answer is yes. This is done by
ensuring that the primary inputs to the circuit are available in
both true and complemented forms. Now, any Boolean logic
function can be expressed in sum-of-product form using only
true literals if the true and complemented form of every input is
considered to be a separate variable. In other words, the function
can be implemented using AND and OR gates if both true and
complemented of the primary inputs are available.
Observe that although the complemented primary inputs can
result in 1→ 0 transition, these transitions can be guaranteed to
occur during the precharge phase since they occur immediately
after the clock edge. For instance, in the example netlist in
Figure 4, observe that a 1 → 0 transitions only occurs at the
output of the static CMOS inverter driven by primary input B.
Provided that the propagation delay of the static CMOS inverter
is less than the half period of the clock, these transitions will
occur in the PRE phase and will not cause problems. All other
transitions in the netlist only occur in the EVAL phase and are
always 0→ 1 transitions.
E. Robustness to Process Variation
Since our TD camouflaged cells depend on the threshold
voltage, we must have careful consideration to the robustness
to manufacturing process variations. Variations in doping con-
centration, which directly affect the operating threshold voltage,
should not cause incorrect behaviour of the cell. In particular,
Fig. 4: The camouflaged cells integrate with the rest of the design
with their appropriate function, yet through visual inspection
of the layout the individual function of each cell cannot be
determined because they share the same exact structure.
even if the high-VTh (VTh,H ) and low-VTh (VTh,L) implemen-
tations vary around their nominal values, TD camouflaged cells
should continue to operate as AND and OR gates, respectively.
We should specially consider the slow corner for VTh,L and
the fast corner for VTh,H . Assuming that ∆VTh is the maxi-
mum difference (positive or negative) in threshold voltage, that
(VTh,L+∆VTh) characterizes the slow corner for low-VTh, and
that (VTh,H − ∆VTh) characterizes the fast corner for High-
VTh, for correct operation equation 1 is a condition that must
be satisfied.
(VTh,L + ∆VTh) < (VTh,H −∆VTh) (1)
To satisfy 1, the mid-point voltage of INV1 must be set
between VTh,L + ∆VTh and VTh,H − ∆VTh. We can achieve
this by skewing INV1 so that the cut-off threshold voltage is
suitable for detecting the logic 0 or 1 value that is reached by
Node X in Fig. 2.
In Section V we establish a range of skew values for which
the cell works correctly, including the aforementioned corner
cases.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have used 22 nm technology libraries from the ASU
Process Technology Model (PTM) repository [21] for imple-
menting our TD camouflaged cells. The 22 nm technology has
customizable predictive model files for both high performance
(low-VTh) and low power (high-VTh) transistors. We used the
HSPICE circuit simulation tool for all simulations. The nominal
supply voltage for this technology is VDD = 1 V . The 3σ
variability in doping concentration is assumed to be 15% of
the nominal doping concentration for both the low power and
high performance libraries.
First, we characterize the delay, power consumption and
robustness of our proposed TD camouflaged cells. Then we
present a case study by integrating TD camouflaged cells into a
large benchmark netlist and analyze delay and power overheads
as a function of the number of camouflaged gates.
Fig. 5: Delay as a function of size of NMOS width of INV1 for
all nine PT (process and temperature corners) of both low-VTh
and high-VTh TD camouflaged cells.
A. Robustness of TD camouflaged cells
Our first goal is to size transistors so as to guarantee
robustness against PVT variations. To do so, we considered
±15% process variations in threshold voltage 1, temperature
ranging from 273K to 373K and a Vdd range from 0.85V to
1.15V . Figure 5 shows the delay of the TD camouflaged cells
on the y-axis versus size of the NMOS transistor in INV1 (for
a fixed PMOS size) on the x-axis for different PVT corners.
We find that the for NMOS sizes ranging between 50 nm and
250 nm, the cell works correctly over all PVT corners and for
both the the low-Vth and high-Vth cases. We therefore picked
an NMOS INV1 size of 80 nm.
B. Power and Delay Characterization of TD camouflaged cells
In Table II we present the propagation delay and power
consumption of the proposed TD camouflaged cells as well as
conventional domino logic AND and OR gates. TD camouflaged
cells with OR function (implemented with low-VTh transistors)
have a delay 5.16× greater than a low-VTh domino OR. Also,
when a TD camouflaged cells functions as an AND gate (im-
plementation with high-VTh transistors), it presents a delay that
is 4.08× greater than a high-VTh domino AND. From a power
perspective, we note that the overheads for the TD camouflaged
cells are 1.39× and 1.04× the corresponding values for the
domino AND and OR gates, respectively.
C. Results of Netlist Integration of TD camouflaged cells
To provide a better understanding of the impact of the
delay and power overheads caused by TD camouflaged cells we
have integrated our camouflaged logic circuits into a benchmark
netlist. The logic circuits are first implemented using domino
logic after which a randomly chosen subset of gates is camou-
flaged. We have used random selection [26] in this work, yet
other selection algorithms may also be used [6].
We have implemented an automated toolflow using the
Berkeley SIS synthesis framework [27]. It’s input is combina-
tional logic described in .pla format and outputs an implemen-
tation that can be implemented using domino logic (similar to
Figure 4). To do this, we replace the complemented form of
1This assumption is justified by results in [25] that indicate a 3σ of variation
in threshold voltage to be 90 mV at 22 nm.
TABLE I: Delay and Power Characteristics of TD camouflaged
cells (TDCC)
Static CMOS Domino TDCC
AND OR AND OR AND OR
Delay
(ps)
Low Vth 7.68 11.26 9.93 4.98 – 25.7
High Vth 34.03 50.47 66.00 23.63 269.8 –
Po
w
er
(µ
W
)
A B
Low
Vth
0 0 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.29 - 2.49
0 0→ 1 0.57 7.32 0.11 9.17 - 8.64
0→ 1 0 0.13 5.92 0.37 9.17 - 8.07
0→ 1 0→ 1 7.93 6.61 5.81 8.94 - 9.41
High
Vth
0 0 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.13 -
0 0→ 1 0.96 1.55 0.01 3.36 0.37 -
0→ 1 0 0.84 1.48 0.13 3.36 0.38 -
0→ 1 0→ 1 1.29 1.49 1.66 3.78 1.65 -
each variable with a new variable and input the new .pla file to
SIS. The netlist that is used has non-complemented gates, and
we further restrict our current implementation to the use of just
AND and OR gates.
For our netlist integration of TD camouflaged cells we
have used the benchmark apex5 from the MCNC benchmark
suite. This benchmark has 234 inputs, 37 outputs, and 2382
product terms. The results are normalized to the uncamouflaged
domino logic baseline implementation. For consistency, all AND
gates were implemented using high-VTh and all OR gates were
implemented using low-VTh, even though other selection criteria
may be used. As expected, Table II presents results obtained
from simulations. With 40% of the gates camouflaged the delay
overhead is around 72.7% and power overhead is near 31%.
These results may vary depending on which set of gates are
chosen to be camouflaged and which non camouflaged gates
will be fabricated with which process (high performance or low
power). It is necessary to take into consideration the delay and
power overheads as well as the critical path.
TABLE II: Delay and Power Overhead of TD camouflaged cells
Percent of Camouflaged Cells in Netlist
10% 20% 30% 40%
Delay 1.3613 1.5153 1.6305 1.7270
Power 1.0770 1.1551 1.2327 1.3105
VI. POSSIBLE ATTACKS
Like other camouflaging solutions, there are potential ap-
proaches that attackers could use to determine the identities of
camouflaged gates. These include measuring the etch rate during
chemical deprocessing, which could be used to determine which
which transistor is more heavily doped. In addition, an attacker
might use the difference in power and delay characteristics
of camouflaged gates to determine their identities. However,
all camouflaging techniques are susceptible to this attack to
some degree. Finally, attackers might develop more accurate
techniques to measure the doping concentration of transistor
channels, but this represents that natural cat-and-mouse game
between attackers and defenders.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work proposes a new threshold dependent camouflaging
technique that protects digital ICs against delayering and optical
imaging based IC reverse engineering. Existing solutions consist
of camouflaging Boolean functionality of a cell via the place-
ment of true and dummy contacts, therefore they posses a vulner-
ability since they can be identified depending on the difference of
the contacts. However, our proposed TD camouflaged cells only
differ in operating threshold voltage and have the same physical
structure regardless of their Boolean functionality. The threshold
voltage of the cell depends on the inherent doping concentration
of the transistor which cannot be determined by using traditional
reverse engineering optical imaging techniques. Although other
means for determining doping concentration exist, they have
limited spatial resolution or accuracy.
We have presented an analysis of delay and power con-
sumption overhead for our proposed TD camouflaged cells.
This IC camouflaging alternative is based on a design that
leverages the threshold-voltage dependent level shifting property
cascaded pass gates, and is shown to be robust against process
variations incurred during manufacturing. TD camouflaged cells
can be seamlessly incorporated into a netlist with domino logic
gates. Experimental results indicate that camouflaging up to
40% of gates of the apex5 benchmark induced delay and power
overheads near than 70% and 30%, respectively.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Consequently, our proposed TD camouflaged cells increase
the effort necessary for attackers who wish to reverse engineer
the netlist of a digital IC. Future work will focus on designing
a more comprehensive library of TD camouflaged cells, further
optimizing the delay, as well as power and robustness of TD
camouflaged cells. Understanding vulnerabilities that may come
from the analysis of side channels as well as defending against
advanced attacks is crucial.
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